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I. INTRODUCTION
Angela Onwuachi-Willig's powerful new book, According to Our
Hearts: Rhinelander v. Rhinelander and the Law of the Multiracial Family,1
delves deeply into the intersections between race and family that remain to
this day, despite facially race-neutral family law. The book expertly
examines the unearned privileges that have long attached to monoracial
marriage to the detriment of couples who did not, and do not, meet that
ideal. Starting with a detailed analysis of the transcript and press accounts of
Rhinelander v. Rhinelander-a sensational New York trial from the 1920s in
which a white man sought annulment of his marriage to a woman of
"racially ambiguous heritage,"2-and moving to contemporary interviews of
twenty-one "black-white couples," 3 Onwuachi-Willig illustrates how law
and society posit monoracial marriage as the ideal marriage. Onwuachi-
Willig then analyzes the consequences of that construction, revealing how
the monoracial marital ideal produces race, maintains white privilege, and
harms individuals who do not conform.
Onwuachi-Willig's project is to bring all marriages into the privileged
fold, regardless of the race of their participants. She calls on lawyers,
lawmakers, and legal scholars to challenge the monoracial marital ideal in
all its subtlety, including its operation in domains outside of the home. In
doing so, Onwuachi-Willig seeks to transcend the limits of a legal regime
rooted in formal equality, setting forth reforms designed to distribute the
benefits and security of marriage to all spouses and their children regardless
of race.
Onwuachi-Willig's project is important in and of itself, as it strives to
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I. ANGELA ONWUACHI-WILLIG, ACCORDING TO OUR HEARTS: RHINELANDER V.
RHINELANDER AND THE LAW OF THE MULTIRACIAL FAMILY (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript)
(on file with author).
2. Id. at 3.
3. Id. at 8-11 (discussing demographics of interviewees and interview methodology).
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make family law substantively equal for all. At the same time, Onwuachi-
Willig also lays the foundation for a different project, one that thoroughly
interrogates the ways that marital status itself maintains hierarchies of
privilege. This Article takes on that project, examining how Onwuachi-
Willig's challenge to the monoracial marital ideal, without more, may limit
understandings of relationships and race. In contrast, a broader challenge to
the marital ideal provides fodder for new ways of imagining both. Part II
situates Onwuachi-Willig's analysis within the general regulation of
marriage, both legal and extralegal. Part III examines the invisible privileges
attaching not just to monoracial marriage, but to marriage as a distinct form
of relationship. Part IV then builds upon Onwuachi-Willig's novel insight
that monoracial marital privilege extends beyond the social sphere to the
workplace, arguing that Onwuachi-Willig's account leads to consequential
new understandings of the relational nature of race.
II. THE POWER AND LIMITS OF MARITAL STATUS
States have long permitted some, but not others, to obtain the legal
status of spouse. 4 As Onwuachi-Willig emphasizes, many of these
restrictions historically worked to the detriment of African Americans.5
Until the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, slave states
generally did not permit slaves to marry legally.6 Many states-slave and
free-also mandated that white people marry other white people, and such
restrictions persisted well into the twentieth century.7 Indeed, at the time of
the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia, which held such
anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional, sixteen states "prohibit[ed] and
punish[ed] marriages on the basis of racial classifications."8
In addition to anti-miscegenation laws, states limited access to legal
marriage in other ways that were also subsequently deemed unconstitutional.
Asian immigrants encountered numerous obstacles to marriage, imposed by
both state and federal law, even when they sought to marry other Asian
4. For a general overview, see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE
AND THE NATION passim (2000).
5. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 123-27.
6. One exception was in Maryland, which at one point permitted white women to marry
slaves, yet mandated that such women be slaves themselves for as long as their husbands lived. See
RANDALL KENNEDY, INTERRACIAL INTIMACIES: SEX, MARRIAGE, IDENTITY, AND ADOPTION 59-60
(2003).
7. See id. at 216-28; RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF
RACE & ROMANCE 17-19 (2001). As Onwuachi-Willig points out, however, the category of "white"
was often expansive, including many or all races other than African Americans. See ONWUACHI-
WILLIG, supra note I, at 124 (citing MORAN, supra, at 17).
8. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 (1967).
[16:2013]
Marital Status and Privilege
immigrants.9 Some states required individuals paying child support, no
matter their race or the race of their proposed spouses, to obtain judicial
approval to marry. 0 Some states prohibited prisoners from marrying. "
Although states may no longer limit legal marriage in these ways,
restrictions on marriage still remain. Most basically, all states limit marriage
to couples.12 A sole individual may not obtain the legal status of spouse,
groups of more than two individuals may not legally marry, and individuals
already legally married may not enter into another legally valid marriage
without first obtaining a divorce or annulment. 13
Moreover, these couples must meet certain requirements. Forty-one
states continue to mandate that married couples be mixed-sex. 14 All states
mandate that members of couples be over a certain age and deny marriage to
couples who are within a certain degree of consanguinity or legal relation. 15
All states may refuse to recognize couples who are legally married in other
jurisdictions on public policy grounds.16 Finally, once couples are deemed
9. See PAMELA HAAG, CONSENT: SEXUAL RIGHTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 97-118 (1999); Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the
Federalization of Immigration Law, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 641 passim (2005).
10. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-91 (1978) (declaring such a restriction
unconstitutional).
11. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96-99 (1987) (holding that a state statute prohibiting
incarcerated individuals from marrying was unconstitutional).
12. That legal marriage is reserved for couples is most obviously illustrated by concerns (or
hopes) that recognition of same-sex marriage will open the door to legal polygamy. See, e.g., David
L. Chambers, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53 passim (1997). For an
argument refuting the analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamy, see Adrienne D. Davis,
Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy. Dqefult Rules, and Bargaining.lor Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1955, 1987-95 (2010).
13. This requirement that only groups of two individuals, legally unattached to third parties,
may be married was recently reinforced in Elia-Warnken v. Elia, 972 N.E.2d 17, 21-22 (Mass.
2012), in which the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that an individual in a civil union
recognized by Vermont was required to dissolve that union before he could legally marry a third
individual in Massachusetts.
14. Connecticut, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York,
Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia currently extend legal marriage to same-sex
couples. PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE &
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 2,10-11 (3d ed. 2013).
15. The specific age, as well as the degree of relationship, varies from state to state. See, e.g.,
Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Unifbrm Marriage Laws,
84 OR. L. REV. 433, 437-46 (2005). In addition, some states' restrictions apply only to so-called
blood relationships, whereas other states' restrictions extend to people related by adoption. See, e.g.,
In re Adoption of M., 722 A.2d 615 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1998).
16. See Grossman, supra note 15, at 461-77 (providing additional grounds for exceptions to
the common law rule of lex loci). The federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) also specifies that
states are not required to recognize same-sex marriages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
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eligible for legal marriage, all states require those couples to obtain a license
from the state and to solemnize it," or, in a few states, to demonstrate that
they have met the requirements for common law marriage. 
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States thus continue to serve as the exclusive gatekeeper of legal
marriage. 19 A state, and only a state, may extend the legal status of marriage,
whether by granting a license that is later solemnized, recognizing a
common law marriage, or deciding to recognize a marriage that is valid in
another jurisdiction. Benefits, obligations, and default rules then flow from
state recognition. 20 The federal government currently recognizes only a
single subset of marriages deemed valid by states-those between mixed-sex
couples 2 '-but the federal government recognizes no marriages that are not
otherwise validated, or eligible for validation, by a state.
22
17. The policy favoring marriage validity generally means, however, that a violation of a
formality requirement will not void a marriage unless the jurisdiction expressly makes a marriage
invalid without a license or solemnization. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-31 (West 2007) (stating,
with respect to defects in licensure or solemnization, that a marriage "shall [not] be deemed or
adjudged to be void ... if the marriage be in all other respects lawful, and be consummated with a
full belief on the part of the persons so married, or either of them, that they have been lawfully
joined in marriage").
18. Nine states (Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Texas, and Utah) and the District of Columbia currently grant full marital status to those couples that
meet the requirements for common law marriage, which generally involve two individuals living
together, agreeing that they are married, and holding themselves out as husband and wife. Common-
Law Marriage, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-
research/human-services/common-law-marriage.aspx. New Hampshire recognizes common law
marriage only for purposes of distributing spousal assets at death. Id. Five states (Georgia, Idaho,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania) recognize only those common-law marriages established before
a certain date. Id.
19. Cf Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 (Mass. 2003) (emphasizing
that the plaintiffs seeking same-sex marriage recognition did "not attack the binary nature of
marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of the other gate-keeping provisions of the marriage
licensing law").
20. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV. 129,
146-52 (2003) (describing the range of consequences that flow from state recognition of marriage).
21. Two circuit courts recently held that this aspect of the Defense of Marriage Act was
unconstitutional, and the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in one of them. See Gill v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert.
granted, No. 12-307, 2012 WL 4009654 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012).
22. Indeed, "[t]o the extent that there has ever been 'uniform' or 'consistent' rule in federal
law concerning marriage, it is that marriage is 'a virtually exclusive province of the States."'
Windsor, 699 F.3d at 186 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)). DOMA requires the
federal government to first "ask whether a couple was married under the law of the state of
domicile" before "adding 'an additional criterion, requiring the federal government to identify and
exclude all same-sex marital unions from federal recognition."' Id. (quoting Pedersen v. Office of
Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:10-cv-1750 (VLB), 2012 WL 3113883, at *48 (D. Conn. July 31, 2012)). A
limited exception to this principle exists in the context of Social Security benefits, in which a
marriage may be "deemed valid" even if it is not recognized under state law, provided that the
individual seeking spousal benefits "in good faith ... went through a marriage ceremony with the
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Although states serve this gatekeeping role, states have largely stopped
regulating what must occur within marriage. For much of our nation's
history, such regulation was robust. State-recognized marriage was the only
site for legal sex, as states criminalized and punished nonmarital sex. 23 This
intersection of marriage law and criminal law meant that states constructed
marriage as a sexual relationship. 24 Indeed, state laws declared marriages
voidable if not sexually consummated.25 Moreover, states mandated that this
sexual relationship be monogamous, as all states criminalized adultery and
posited adultery as a fault-based ground for divorce.
26
Up until the 1970s, states also mandated distinct roles for husbands and
wives within marriage. 27 By criminalizing sex outside of marriage, states
attempted to confine sex to those situations in which men would be readily
available to provide consistent financial support to any children conceived as
a result of that sex and to the women who would bear and care for them.
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Marriage law mandated that wives, in exchange for their husbands' financial
support, provide all other forms of daily care and support to their children
and husbands.29 States therefore mandated that husbands be breadwinners
and wives be caregivers.3" States required wives to take on that caregiving
insured that would have resulted in a valid marriage except for a legal impediment," defined to
include "only an impediment which results because a previous marriage had not ended at the time of
the ceremony or because there was a defect in the procedure followed in connection with the
intended marriage." 20 C.F.R. § 404.346 (1993).
23. See Melissa E. Murray, Strange Bediellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1264-73 (2009); Laura A. Rosenbury &
Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 814-15 (2010); Carl E.
Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 502-03 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1977) (citation omitted) (describing
marriage as "the only relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to
take place").
25. See, e.g., Woods v. Woods, 638 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding that
failure to consummate made marriage voidable, not void); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, A Dead
Language: Divorce Law and Practice Before No-Fault, 86 VA. L. REV. 1497, 1509 (2000)
(examining the relevance of consummation in divorce cases prior to no-fault divorce laws).
26. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, De/ault Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1913 (2012) (discussing "mandatory
rules criminalizing adultery"); Friedman, supra note 25, at 1512 25 (discussing the role of adultery
in divorce cases prior to the no-fault revolution).
27. COTT, supra note 4, at 7 ("Marriage decisively differentiated the positions of husband and
wife.").
28. See Schneider, supra note 23, at 496-503.
29. See, e.g., Joan Williams, From Dffference to Dominance to Domesticity: Care as Work,
Gender as Tradition, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1441, 1460-67 (2001) (discussing care and support
required of wives).
30. Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 2 ("[T]he sexes [traditionally] had distinct and well-defined gender roles: husbands were
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role even when they also worked for wages, as was the case for many
immigrant women, working class women, and women of color.3 1 Therefore,
marriage was the exclusive site of legal sex as well as a site in which care,
both financial and nonfinancial, was repeatedly exchanged.
Today, life-long sexual monogamy is no longer a defining characteristic
of legal marriage, and states do not restrict family functions to one gender or
another. All states permit a wide range of consensual sexual activity between
adults outside of marriage, including adultery. 32 In addition, specific fault
grounds for divorce, such as adultery, have given way to no-fault divorce
regimes in which one or both spouses may assess what types of activities,
sexual and otherwise, are good for the marriage and which are not.33 States
also no longer assume that women will be dependent on men, 34 and thus no
longer mandate gender role divisions within marriage. 35 Instead, state
statutes governing marriage now place husbands and wives in the same
position, subject to the same obligations and receiving the same benefits. 36
Thus, gender is now legally relevant to marriage only in the forty-one states
that limit marriage to mixed-sex couples, and the laws of those states are
economic providers, disciplinarians, and the heads of families, while wives were nurturers,
caretakers, and subservient to their husbands.").
31. TERESA L. AMoTT & JULIE A. MATTHAEI, RACE, GENDER, AND WORK: A
MULTICULTURAL ECONOMIC HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 297-300 (rev. ed. 1991).
32. However, some restrictions on sexual activities remain. All states criminalize adult
consensual incest, prostitution, and public and quasi-public sexual conduct, and several jurisdictions
attach civil penalties to various sexual activities outside of marriage, including adultery. See
Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 23, at 816-17. In addition, a few states still recognize tort claims
arising out of adultery. Lance McMillian, Adultery as Tort, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1987 passim (2012).
33. See, e.g., BRENDA COSSMAN, SEXUAL CITIZENS: THE LEGAL AND CULTURAL
REGULATION OF SEX AND BELONGING 107-14 (2007) (discussing the ways that monogamy within
marriage has become a project, not a mandate, since the advent of no-fault divorce laws).
34. This change is most obviously reflected in states' move away from awarding robust
alimony payments upon divorce, in favor of equitable distribution of property. Laura A. Rosenbury,
Two Ways to End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1227, 1234-43 [hereinafter
Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage]. In addition, increased employment opportunities have
given women the means to support themselves. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) (codifying Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964). States have also extended child support obligations to all biological
fathers (unless they are explicitly sperm donors), whether married to their children's biological
mothers or not. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (providing
states with federal block grants only when they have programs in place to establish paternity to
enforce child support payments, regardless of the putative father's marital relationship with the
child's biological mother). As such, states have developed ways to privatize the dependency of
children outside of marriage.
35. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY,
AND RESPONSIBILITY 60-61 (2006); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L.
REV. 1443, 1517-22 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the
Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 110-14 (2005).
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gender-specific only at the point of access to marriage. 37
Given that states no longer regulate the substance of marriage,
marriages have become increasingly diverse. Although the terms husband
and wife remain in regular use, some married individuals prefer the terms
spouse or partner. 38 Some mixed-sex spouses adopt traditional gender roles,
others reverse those roles, still others embrace various conceptions of
equalitarian marriage or otherwise attempt to eschew gender roles, and some
claim such roles were irrelevant in the first place. 39 Some same-sex spouses
may attempt to replicate the roles found in traditional marriage, others may
seek to transcend those roles, and still others may perform gender in ways
that do not map onto traditional understandings of male and female. 40 And
all spouses may choose to live together or not, have sex or not, raise children
or not, love each other or not, care for each other or not, be monogamous or
not, and so on.
4 1
In light of this diversity, "marriage" today could be unintelligible,
carrying no stable meaning beyond a coupled relationship recognized by the
state with the benefits, obligations, and default rules that flow from such
recognition. 42  Yet "marriage" generally connotes more than state
recognition. Most people accept that couples are married when they say they
are married, without inspecting their marriage licenses or otherwise
confirming the legal validity of their marriages. Being in a couple and
37. See NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 14, at 2, 10-11 (listing states that currently recognize
same-sex marriage and providing citations to relevant state statutes or judicial decisions). See also
Mary Anne Case, What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 57 UCLA L. REV.
1199, 1202 (2010) [hereinafter Case, Feminists] ("To grant civil marriage licenses to couples
regardless of their sex would be to eliminate the last vestige of sex stereotyping from the law of
marriage in the United States. It would complete the evolution away from sex-role differentiated,
inegalitarian marriage law that began with nineteenth-century efforts to ameliorate the effects of
coverture and continued in legislative reform and constitutional adjudication through the last third of
the twentieth century.").
38. See, e.g., Margot Page, Labels of Married Lift, in a New Light, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/fashion/labels-of-married-life-in-a-new-light-modem-
love.html?pagewanted=all; Steven Petrow, Is It Gay Husband? Lesbian Wife? Or What?, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/27/booming/is-it-gay-husband-lesbian-wife
-or-what.html? r-0.
39. Sandra Tsing Loh, My So-Called Wile, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/opinion/24tsingloh.html; Morley Winograd & Michael D.
Hais, Op-Ed., As Millennials Reject Gender Roles, But Embrace Marriage, They're Changing
Society, CHRISTIAN SCt. MONITOR, May 24, 2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion
/2012/0524/As-Millennials-reject-gender-roles-but-embrace-marriage-they-re-changing-society.
40. Courtney Megan Cahill, Celebrating the Differences That Could Make a D4f]irence:
United States v. Virginia and a New Vision of'Sexual Equality, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 943, 969-79 (2009).
41. Cf Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1765 (2005) (engaging
in a similar discussion of the diverse performances available within legal marriage).
42. For an argument in favor of such a "thin" view of marriage, see Case, Feminists, supra
note 37, at 1203-06.
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invoking the term is enough.43
Marriage is thus performed through the use of the terms "married,"
"husband," "wife," and "spouse." Social assumptions about the nature of the
relationship then flow from those terms, even as the state no longer
mandates that marriages be performed in certain ways. In this way,
"normative definitions of family" are about much more than law. an
According to Our Hearts targets these extralegal aspects of marriage.
At the time of Rhinelander, the State of New York did not mandate that
people marry within their race or class, or that the parents of both spouses
approve of the marriage; indeed, the state extended the legal status of
marriage to Leonard, a white man from a wealthy family, and Alice, a
woman from a working-class family who at trial conceded she was not
white. 45 Leonard and Alice were married in the eyes of the law, and they
could have maintained that status "till death do [they] part." The social
expectations attached to that status, not the state, imperiled their marital
future.
If they had so desired, Leonard and Alice could have responded to this
mismatch between legal status and social expectations by doing more to
perform their marriage. Even as portions of society assumed marriage was
and should be monoracial,46 Leonard and Alice could have confronted that
assumption by proudly declaring that they were husband and wife.47 In a
similar way, Leonard and Alice could have confronted the assumption that
wealthy people did not marry poorer people. And Leonard could have
confronted the assumption of parental approval by forgoing that approval
43. This is likely why same-sex marriage advocates urge states to extend the term "marriage"
to same-sex couples even when same-sex couples in registered domestic partnerships or civil unions
receive the same benefits as married couples. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 452-53 (Cal.
2008); Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008); Vamum v. Brien, 763
N.W.2d 862, 905-07 (Iowa 2009); Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566-72
(Mass. 2004). At the same time, nothing would seem to prevent individuals from claiming they are
married even when the state does not recognize them as such, provided that they do not seek state
benefits or otherwise engage in fraud. Indeed, a state would likely violate the First Amendment if it
prohibited individuals from using the term "marriage" in the absence of legal status. The Author
thanks Jennifer Rothman for initially raising this point. Of course, same-sex couples may still be
harmed if the state prevents them from using the term "marriage" in their interactions with the state.
See Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law's Social Meanings,
97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1308-15 (2011).
44. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 121.
45. If Leonard and Alice had never been legally married, no litigation would have been
required, and there would have been no marriage to annul. The trial thus was a direct result of the
legal validity of the marriage, and the jury ultimately affirmed that validity. See id. at 4.
46. See id. at 4. Notably, however, Alice's family did not make such assumptions, nor did
much of her community. See id. at 185-86.
47. In many ways, this is what Dean Camille Nelson and her spouse did decades later. See id.
at 133.
[16:2013]
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and the money that flowed from it. Annulment or divorce were not his only
options.
That Leonard and Alice did not perform their marriage in this way
illustrates the power of social, as opposed to legal, conceptions of marriage.
Onwuachi-Willig richly illustrates Leonard's inability to stand up to his
father and his lawyers. 48 Even more so, she analyzes the two primary
choices Leonard confronted: the choice between family money and his legal
marriage, and the choice between high society acceptance and his legal
marriage.49 Leonard failed to choose his legal marriage in both instances. 5
0
The very fact that Leonard faced these choices is, in some ways,
counterintuitive. Marriage has long been a mechanism for conveying family
wealth, not disrupting that conveyance. 51 Indeed, despite the portrayal of
marriage as an effective relationship in most modem family law
scholarship,52 marriage was historically an economic exchange between
families and it remains a mechanism designed to distribute resources to this
day.53 Likewise, legal marriage has long furthered social status rather than
thwarting it; after all, marriage has been, and remains, the only relationship
between adults officially recognized and supported by all fifty states.
54
Yet society does not treat all marriages alike even if they are equal
48. See, e.g., id. at 32-33.
49. Id. at 37-39.
50. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 37-39.
51. See, e.g., Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage, supra note 34 passim.
52. See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part II, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
189 passim (2011) (analyzing and critiquing how family law professors in the twentieth century
separated the family from the market, focusing on the affective nature of family relationships); Laura
T. Kessler, New Frontiers of Family Law, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 226, 240 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011)
(arguing that "family law is becoming or is at least on the verge of becoming the law of intimacy").
Onwuachi-Willig herself appears to embrace this view when she laments that "true intimacy" or
"true relationships" between African Americans and whites often did not result in mariage in the
pre-Civil Rights era. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 127.
53. See Halley, supra note 52, at 195; Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage, supra note
34 passim. Onwuachi-Willig's personal narrative about the presentation of a bill at an ice cream
shop and the story told by one of her interview subjects about splitting a restaurant bill between
couples (as opposed to individuals), reveals that marriage is still perceived as creating an economic
unit. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 175.
54. Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 216-19 (2007)
[hereinafter Rosenbury, Friends with Benqfits?]. Of course, intestacy laws recognize relationships
between parents and their adult children, between adult siblings, and between other adults who are
otherwise related by blood or adoption. See Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage, supra note
34, at 1261-62. However, the state does not affirmatively support those relationships-all states
permit adults to execute wills that explicitly disinherit such non-spousal relatives. For a general
discussion of the justifications for this testamentary freedom, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S.
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of'the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6-14 (1992).
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before the law. Rhinelander provides one example of a legal marriage that
met resistance from wealthy, white society. The narratives of Onwuachi-
Willig's interview subjects likewise reveal the ways that society privileges
some legal marriages over others. 55 Even as legal marriage is now formally
race-neutral, social understandings of marriage remain deeply raced-
privileging white couples over all others and privileging monoracial couples
over interracial ones. 5
6
These extralegal understandings of marriage are powerful. However,
that power does not mean law plays no role in perpetuating marital
hierarchies. Onwuachi-Willig illustrates the ways law perpetuates housing
segregation, discouraging the formation of interracial relationships and often
limiting the areas in which interracial spouses feel comfortable living. 57 In
even more detail, Onwuachi-Willig also analyzes how some courts have
adopted narrow interpretations of employment discrimination laws, failing to
provide redress for employees facing harassment or adverse employment
actions because of their interracial relationships.58 Such interpretations
render invisible the ways employers may privilege employees in monoracial
marriages to the detriment of employees in interracial marriages. 59
In her quest to bring all marriages into the privileged fold, Onwuachi-
Willig thus exposes many of the important ways law supports the
monoracial marital ideal. Even more intersections between law and
extralegal norms emerge if we extend Onwuachi-Willig's project to
interrogate why marriage is privileged at all. States originally recognized
legal marriage in order to provide incentives for white men to privatize the
dependency of white women and their children.60 Indeed, marriage law and
the law of slavery worked in tandem to encourage white men to take on the
support of children conceived with both white women and women who were
enslaved; white men received the benefits of marriage in exchange for
supporting their "legitimate" children while they received the benefit of
increased property accumulation for overseeing offspring born to slaves. 61
55. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 240-44, 249-50.
56. Id. at 156-84.
57. Id. at 185-98; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State's Role in
the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1398-99 (2009).
58. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 195-201, 207-12.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 23, at 496-503.
61. See Laura F. Edwards, "'The Marriage Covenant Is at the Foundation ofAll Our Rights
The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina After Emancipation, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 81, 82
(1996) ("Before emancipation, white household heads assumed economic, legal, and moral
responsibility for a range of dependents, who included African-American slaves as well as white
women and children.").
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As states made marriage available to freed slaves and other African
Americans, that construct of marriage did not change. 62 As Onwuachi-Willig
has illustrated in previous work: "One method for accomplishing the
integration of former slaves into free society without burdening Whites with
related economic costs was to insist that newly freed Blacks adopt and
comply with the standard legal institution of marriage."63 States thus
extended marriage on the terms previously only available to white men and
their dependent women. The state's interest in privatizing dependency and
regulating sex was opened to all who conformed to mixed-sex coupledom,
but that openness fostered assimilation, not transformation.
64
Many extralegal assumptions about marriage thus grow out of a state
institution created around white needs and norms. 65 Color-blindness and,
ultimately, gender-blindness did not erase the color or gender of legal
marriage. Instead, white privilege, male privilege, and heterosexual privilege
so infused the institution of legal marriage that color-blindness and gender-
blindness became a way of extending some, but not all, of that privilege to
those who were not white or male or, now, even heterosexual (in some
states).
Given these connections between the origins of legal marriage and the
extralegal assumptions that Onwuachi-Willig seeks to address, it seems
logical to go beyond Onwuachi-Willig's project to challenge legal marriage
itself. According to Our Hearts confirms that changing the law of marriage
often does not change extralegal assumptions about marriage. 66 Although
internal changes to legal marriage have not been sufficient, broader changes
designed to dislodge marriage's role in defining the legal family might serve
Onwuachi-Willig's goals. Indeed, such an approach may be the best way to
achieve Onwuachi-Willig's "hope about a refraining of the normative ideal
for family, or better yet, of a release of any need for an ideal at all." 67
62. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, II YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 passim (1999).
63. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return ofthe Ring: Welfitre Rebrn "s Marriage Cure as
the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1654 (2005).
64. Franke more fully analyzes the regulatory effects of extending legal marriage to African
Americans during the Reconstruction era. See Franke, supra note 62 passim.
65. In other words, marriage law always privileged some individuals over others, in service of
state goals. For more discussion of the history of marriage regulation, see COTT, supra note 4
passim.
66. In my view, this commentary on the limits of law reform within existing structures is one
of the most important contributions of Onwuachi-Willig's analysis, although she does not explicitly
frame the contribution in this manner.
67. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 279-80.
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III. UNPACKING THE INVISIBLE KNAPSACK OF MARITAL PRIVILEGE
Onwuachi-Willig's challenge to the monoracial aspect of "same-race
couple privilege" 68 is deeply important, but stopping there leaves "couple
privilege" intact. Even in Onwuachi-Willig's ideal world, marriage would
remain the only relationship between adults recognized and supported by all
fifty states, thereby privileging some forms of personal life over others. 69
Here, it is useful to turn to Onwuachi-Willig's discussion of Peggy
McIntosh's influential paper, White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible
Knapsack.7" Onwuachi-Willig creatively extends McIntosh's analysis to
examine fifteen invisible privileges enjoyed by monoracial, white, mixed-
sex couples and, to a lesser extent, by monoracial, black, mixed-sex
couples.7' She then compares that list of privileges to the privileges enjoyed
by black-white, mixed-sex couples, finding that such interracial couples
enjoy, at best, two of those fifteen privileges. 72 Onwuachi-Willig concludes
"even in a post-Loving v. Virginia world, black-white, heterosexual couples
encounter discrimination at the intersection of race and family." 73
As discussed in Part II, states mandate none of this modem-day
discrimination. In this way, the discrimination that Onwuachi-Willig
identifies is much like the discrimination that people of color generally
continue to encounter amidst white privilege. 74 Extralegal forces reinforce
white privilege, and monoracial marital privilege, even as law, including
marriage law, is now explicitly race-neutral. Facially race-neutral law has
not eliminated racial hierarchy throughout society.
Yet, although law is now facially race-neutral, it is not family-neutral.
State statutes no longer define race or racial difference.75 Instead, to the
68. Id. at 168.
69. For previous discussion of this privileging of marriage over all other relationships, see
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
70. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 158-59 (discussing Peggy McIntosh, White
Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER IN THE UNITED STATES
188, 189-90 (Paula S. Rothenberg ed., 6th ed. 2004)).
71. Id. at 159-66.
72. Id. at 169-72.
73. Id. at 172.
74. See McIntosh, supra note 70.
75. In contrast, states historically promulgated statutes defining race. See, e.g., Ariela J.
Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century South, 108
YALE L.J. 109 passim (1998). See also Taunya Lovell Banks, Book Review, 44 LAW & SOC'Y REv.
881, 882 (2010) (reviewing PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND
THE MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA (2009)) ("Because the mere existence of miscegenation laws was
insufficient to maintain white dominance, it fell to courts and state legislatures to define and thereby
'produce' race. Once the legal status of these laws seemed secure, mechanisms were needed to
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extent that states still use the term "race" in statutes, primarily anti-
discrimination statutes, courts interpret it to refer to a universal aspect of
identity: all people have a race. 76 In contrast, states continue to define family
to include some and exclude others.
States define family most obviously by determining who is a legal
spouse or a legal parent and then extending the benefits, obligations, and
default rules of marriage and parenthood only to those individuals who
qualify. 77 States also define family in more subtle ways. For example, if an
individual fails to validly execute a will prior to death, states distribute that
individual's property to statutorily defined family members in an order--or
hierarchy-determined by the state governing the probate proceedings.
78
Legal spouses are always at the top of this hierarchy, 79 although they often
must split the estate with the legal children of the decedent, or, in a few
states, they must split the property with the decedent's parents or siblings if
the decedent left no children. 80 In almost all states, individuals who function
as spouses yet do not enjoy the legal status of spouse, such as cohabiting
partners not registered with the state, 81 have no right to make claims against
the deceased spouse's estate. 82 Moreover, if the decedent has no surviving
assure their enforcement. County clerks, law enforcement officials, and keepers of vital statistics
became 'race definers' and 'race police."').
76. For example, four years after Loving, the Supreme Court stated that, in passing Title VII,
"[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what
Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Five years later, the
Court emphasized that Title VIl's prohibition on race discrimination is "not limited to discrimination
against members of any particular race," and similarly found that Section 1981 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 "was meant, by its broad terms, to proscribe discrimination in the making or
enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race." McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273, 278-79, 295 (1976).
77. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 20, at 146-52. These benefits, obligations, and default
rules are not available to individuals who function as family members but do not enjoy the legal
status of spouse or parents. For a critique of this status-based approach to family recognition, see
NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE
LAW passim (2008).
78. See, e.g., Rosenbury, Two Ways to End a Marriage, supra note 34, at 1261-62 (providing
a fifty-state analysis of intestacy statutes).
79. Some states also include individuals registered with the state as a "domestic partner" at
the top of the hierarchy. See id.
80. Id. at 1261-73.
81. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Illegitimacy: Children of Cohabiting Couples and
Stepchildren, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 437, 450-53 (2012); Jennifer Seidman,
Comment, Functional Families and Dysimctional Laws: Committed Partners and Intestate
Succession, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 211,215 (2004).
82. The primary exception is found in Washington, which awards cohabitants an equitable
share of their partners' property upon death if they qualify as being in "committed intimate
relationships." See Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 353-56 (Wash. 2007) (describing the evolution of
the doctrine, including its earlier focus on "meretricious relationships" as articulated in Vasquez v.
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family members, as defined by the state, their estates are given, or "escheat,"
to the state, 3 even when the decedent left behind friends and other loved
ones at death.84
States therefore play an active role in defining family to this day. States
place certain relationships and activities within the legal family and other
relationships and activities outside of it. In so doing, states necessarily
privilege some ways of life and stigmatize others by signaling that some
relationships are deserving of state recognition and support while others are
not.85 Michael Warner puts it bluntly: "Marriage sanctifies some couples at
the expense of others. It is selective legitimacy., 86 Marriage therefore is not
just one choice among many. Instead, by treating marriage like no other
relationship, states position marriage as "the privileged choice[.] ' 87
Current fights over same-sex marriage are, at their root, a manifestation
of this dynamic. Both proponents and opponents explicitly acknowledge
states' power to privilege marriage. Proponents argue that the majority of
states refusing to recognize same-sex marriage should bring same-sex
intimacy into the privileged fold, whereas opponents argue that states should
hold the line at traditional definitions of marriage. 88 Few question whether
states should privilege marriage, or the couple form, at all. 89 Instead, most
Hawthorne, 33 P.3d 735, 739 (Wash. 2001)). A few states also recognize "putative spouse[s]" in
limited circumstances. See, e.g., In re Estate of Vargas, Ill Cal. Rptr. 779, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)
(invoking principles of equity to split estate between deceased spouse's two "spouses" because
second putative spouse in good faith believed she was legal spouse of deceased spouse and
functioned in that manner). For a criticism of the general reliance on legal status, instead of function
or need, in inheritance law, see Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80
N.C. L. REV. 199, 229-35 (2001).
83. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.010 (2000).
84. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, supra note 54, at 204-05 ("Even if friends are
performing many, or all, of the functions traditionally ascribed to spouses, parents, or children,
friends are not eligible ... to inherit each other's estates under state intestacy rules."). See also John
T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 559 (1977)
(advocating for an intestacy regime that recognizes a "decedent's close family might include
nonblood relatives and friends[]").
85. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 20, at 177 (discussing how state-sponsored marriage
"stigmatizes cohabitation as less privileged" and "establishes the gender-dimorphous dyad as the
preferred way to arrange one's private life").
86. Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALIsM/LEFT CRITIQUE 259, 260
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
87. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, supra note 54, at 199; see also id. at 218-19
(discussing the consequences of privileging marriage over friendship).
88. Indeed, there would be little to dispute if marital privilege did not seem desirable. See
Jane S. Schacter, The Other Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 379, 381 83 (2009).
89. Michael Warner and other queer theorists are the primary exceptions. Suzanne Kim also
advocates a "skeptical marriage equality" perspective, which supports same-sex marriage "while
remaining critical of marriage as a legal category and of its privileged status in law and society."
Suzanne A. Kim, Skeptical Marriage Equality, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 37, 41 (2011). In addition,
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arguments center on the appropriate ways to extend or retract that
privilege. 90 The fact that privilege attaches to legal marriage is therefore
assumed and naturalized.
Onwuachi-Willig, even as she embraces a nuanced conception of
privilege, similarly assumes that privilege should flow to marriage; she
would simply like more of the extralegal effects of that privilege to flow to
black-white couples. This, ironically, is particularly salient during
Onwuachi-Willig's discussion of the invisible knapsack of privilege enjoyed
by white monoracial couples and black monoracial couples.9' She identifies
the eleventh privilege as follows: "White, heterosexual couples can go
shopping together, fairly well assured that people will understand that they
are intimate partners and not just friends. When checking out, they rarely
encounter the question: 'Is this together?"' 92 When altering the analysis to
consider black monoracial couples, Onwuachi-Willig modifies the
description slightly: "Black, heterosexual couples can go shopping together,
fairly well assured that people will understand that they are intimate
partners, and not just friends or strangers. When checking out or dining out,
they rarely encounter the question: 'Is this together?"' 93
Onwuachi-Willig targets privilege that monoracial couples no doubt
enjoy and black-white couples often do not. Yet in describing that privilege,
she posits a world in which couples are first, either "intimate partners" or
"just friends," and, later, are either "intimate partners," "just friends," or
"strangers." 94 In doing so, Onwuachi-Willig embraces a hierarchy of
relationships: privilege attaches to the understanding that couples are
"intimate partners," and harm or discrimination flows from the mistaken
perception that they are "just friends." 95 In fact, "just friends" may be just
like "strangers," given the modification of Onwuachi-Willig's description.
Onwuachi-Willig therefore implicitly embraces states' privileging of
Nancy Polikoff convincingly argues why marriage should be "knock[ed] ... off its perch," but her
proposal to "value all families" at times risks reinforcing the norm of coupled interdependence and
care, albeit in both conjugal and nonconjugal forms. See POLIKOFF, supra note 77, at 90, 131-33.
For a fuller discussion, see Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, supra note 54, at 200-01.
90. For one example, see Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective
Responsibility Jbr Dependency, 2004 U. CHt. LEGAL F. 225, 229-30, 236-55 (defending the
privileged status of marriage and arguing that the privilege should be extended to same-sex couples
who choose to marry).
91. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
92. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 160-61.
93. Id. at 164. Onwuachi-Willig uses this modified description a second time when she
describes the ways black-white couples do not enjoy the privilege. See id. at 171.
94. Id. at 160-61, 164, 171.
95. For further analysis of the term "just friends," see Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?,
supra note 54, at 207.
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legal marriage over other relationships between adults, including
friendship. 96 After all, states recognize marriage and only marriage-friends
are generally grouped with strangers for purposes of family law. More
explicitly, like the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,9" Onwuachi-
Willig promotes "one vision of intimacy-that of a couple engaged in
emotional and sexual intimacy."98 She therefore reinforces the common
distinction between individuals who are viewed as dating and those who are
"just friends," a "distinction [that] implies that [the] dating relationship may
lead to the privileged state of marriage, whereas the friendship will not." 99
Onwuachi-Willig does not acknowledge the ways her analysis
reinforces the states' hierarchy of relationships beyond arguing that marriage
should be extended to same-sex couples. Overlooking that hierarchy is one
of the unearned privileges of marriage and, more generally, of the romantic
couple form.' 00 Just as one of the privileges of whiteness is not having to
think about race,' a privilege of marriage is not having to think of the ways
that society is structured around marriage.
Of course the unearned privileges of marriage intersect with other
unearned privileges, including white and monoracial privilege. Legal
marriage provides a floor of privilege, which whiteness and monoraciality
then elevate. Yet white marital privilege, or monoracial marital privilege,
would necessarily be different without the initial floor of privilege supported
by the state. Questioning that floor of unearned privilege very well could
96. This privileging becomes more explicit when Onwuachi-Willig writes: "Alice ... lived
until her late eighties, but to use the word 'lived' may be an exaggeration.... Though surrounded by
her family members, Alice remained alone, never partnering with another man." ONWUACHI-
WILLIG, supra note 1, at 203.
97. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
98. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 23, at 835.
99. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, supra note 54, at 207.
100. For similar points not deploying the language of "unearned privilege," see Vivian
Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 307, 331-35 (2004)
(discussing how "[c]ouples who marry . . . implicitly communicate approval (or, at best, lack of
principled disapproval) of the institutionalized heterosexual privileging that is marriage. ... );
Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, supra note 54, at 199 (arguing that the choice of marriage
"reinforces both the privilege of the couple and the corresponding stigmatization of others").
101. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 254-56. See also BARBARA FLAGG, WAS BLIND BUT
Now I SEE: WHITE RACE CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE LAW 1 (1998) ("[Wihites' social dominance
allows us to relegate our own racial specificity to the realm of the subconscious."); LANI GUINIER &
GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING
DEMOCRACY 90-91 (2002) (arguing that many whites, unlike most African Americans, assume that
race is and/or should be "like a vapor... nonconstraining ... evanescent"); Angela P. Harris, Race
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 604 (1990) ("At a 1988 meeting
of the West Coast 'fem-crits,' Pat Cain and Trina Grillo asked all the women present to pick out two
or three words to describe who they were. None of the white women mentioned their race; all of the
women of color did.").
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help Onwuachi-Willig in her quest for "a refraining of the normative ideal
for family, or better yet, of a release of any need for an ideal at all."'0 2
Once the privilege of marital, and family, status is acknowledged, the
current ideal of family might be better dissected and dismantled. It is
unlikely that law will be capable of positing a completely ideal-less
conception of family. Law by its very nature has regulatory effects,
subjecting people to identities instead of merely reflecting them. 103 Yet
challenging the unearned privilege of marriage by, for instance, legally
recognizing more diverse forms of relationship,' 04 might begin to make the
current ideal of family less intelligible.
If the marital ideal is destabilized in this manner, the role played by
marriage, and particularly monoracial marriage, in feelings of
"belonging,"' 1 5 "place,"' 1 6 and "visibility,"' 0 7 might be reduced. Because
marriage is currently the only relationship between adults affirmatively
recognized and supported by the state, '0 8 marriage is the norm against which
all relationships are measured.l19 Belonging, place, and visibility therefore
are all determined by a couple's ability to conform to that norm. Given the
history of legal marriage and the extralegal assumptions attaching to it, as
discussed in Part II, interracial couples always will be farther from that norm
than monoracial couples. Individuals not in couples, or otherwise not living
in identifiable family forms, are even farther from the norm." 0 Such
disparities are likely to persist until the norm becomes less intelligible.
Unpacking the knapsack of unearned marital privilege, and spreading
its goods across a broader range of relationships, therefore appears to be the
102. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 279-80.
103. See JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 9-12, 204 (2004); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 103-14 (Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990)
(1978).
104. For some ideas about how to recognize more diverse forms of relationship, see POLIKOFF,
supra note 77, at 123-45; Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy's Law: Compulsory Monogamy and
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 354-61 (2004); Katherine M.
Franke, Longing.for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2703 (2008); Alice Ristroph & Melissa
Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 199 YALE L.J. 1236, 1270-78 (2010); Rosenbury, Friends with
Benefits?, supra note 54, at 220-33.
105. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 183.
106. Id. at 132.
107. Id. at 174.
108. For previous discussion of this privileging of marriage over all other relationships, see
supra note 54 and accompanying text.
109. See Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, supra note 54, at 218-19.
110. After all, couples at the very least have the place created by the floor of "marriage" or
"family," whereas others do not. Similarly, couples are generally more visible than those who live in
unintelligible families.
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best strategy for loosening, if not releasing, the ideal of family. In a world
that recognized more diverse forms of relationship, place-based racial
hierarchies and other forms of white privilege would still disadvantage black
couples and black-white couples.1"' But legal marriage would no longer
clearly privilege some and stigmatize others, cracking the foundation of
extralegal forces that maintain hierarchies of relationship. Such disruption of
marital privilege in turn has the potential to affect ways individuals and
families perform their relationships and identities at home, work, and the
spaces between.
IV. BEYOND PRIVILEGED PERFORMANCES
Onwuachi-Willig concludes According to Our Hearts by considering
how monoracial marital privilege extends beyond the social sphere to the
workplace. 112 This is an important contribution, as scholars often assume
that work is immune from the dynamics of intimacy pervading the private
sphere. 13 Indeed, some feminists have posited the workplace as a site of
liberation from the gendered caregiving of the home."14 Other feminists
adopt a more nuanced and sobering view, analyzing the support many male
workers receive from sources outside of the workplace-from stay-at-home
wives or even working wives and other family members-and the ways that
workers without such support are often hampered. 5
Onwuachi-Willig extends these insights, arguing that a "supportive
spouse" is in fact often a "job assistant," at least in many white-collar
workplaces." 6 Marriage in these situations does not merely provide
background support for workers; instead, marriage is part of the job."7 And
if marriage is part of the job, then the differential privilege attaching to
monoracial and interracial marriage will likely impact assessments of job
111. For a discussion of these forms of white privilege, see CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL
CONTRACT 41-42 (1997).
112. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 207-32.
113. For a description and critique of such attempts to assign intimacy to the home and
production to the workplace, see Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 117, 117-20, 134-38 (2011).
114. See, e.g., LINDA R. HIRSHMAN, GET TO WORK ... AND GET A LIFE BEFORE IT'S TOO
LATE 49-63 (2006); Meredith Render, The Man, the State and You: The Role of the State in
Regulating Gender Hierarchies, 14 J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y L. 73, 110-15 (2006); Vicki Shultz,
Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1905-09 (2000).
115. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF
DEPENDENCY 17-49 (2004); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK
CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4-6 (2000).
116. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 228.
117. Id. at 212-19, 227-29 (describingjobs with a "couple requirement").
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performance, benefiting those employees in monoracial marriages and
harming those employees in interracial marriages. 
118
Onwuachi-Willig is rightly concerned about this potential for workplace
discrimination on the basis of the race of one's spouse. She posits that the
relational nature of this discrimination causes much of it to fall through the
cracks of Title VII, despite increasingly expansive interpretations of Title
VII's prohibition of discrimination "because of race."119 Onwuachi-Willig
therefore proposes that discrimination "because of . interraciality" be
added to Title VII's list of prohibitions.
20
Adding "interraciality" to Title VII's list of prohibitions would certainly
bring more visibility to interracial couples, challenging the implicit
assumption that couples are monoracial. Moreover, such an amendment
would identify harm unknown to many people in monoracial marriages,
given monoracial privilege. The amendment therefore would likely have
both symbolic and practical effect.
At the same time, however, Onwuachi-Willig's proposed amendment
also risks reinforcing two existing privileges: marital privilege and
monoracial privilege. Given the discussion of unearned marital privilege in
Part III, it should be obvious how the addition of "interraciality" would
reinforce marital privilege. When marriage is part of the job, all employees
without intelligible partners are harmed. 12 1 "Interraciality" may make
interracial partners more intelligible, bringing them into the charmed circle
of monoracial couple privilege.' 22 In doing so, however, the boundaries of
that circle are strengthened, not weakened. Privilege might be extended to
more spouses, but those living outside the married couple form would
remain stigmatized. 1
23
118. Id.
119. Id. at 195-98.
120. Id. at 22,257.
121. Moreover, employees who do not conform to the gendered expectations of marriage may
also be harmed. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, HARV. J.L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2013).
Cf Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 Wis. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (analyzing "the way
that institutions incorporate historical social practices that presumed women would be marginal
workers and would occupy subordinate roles in both the workplace and family").
122. Cf Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes/fbr a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 281 82 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984)
(discussing the "charmed circle" of acceptable sex).
123. Moreover, marital privilege may be particularly problematic at work because it reinforces
norms of the ideal worker as a white man with a wife at home, freeing him of caregiving
responsibilities. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 29, at 1447-52. All employees live in a world with
others and are defined, at least in pan, by those others. If employers may, without challenge,
privilege marital relationships over other relationships, then white, male norms will pervade the
workplace. Cf Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2029 (1995) (describing the process by which employers
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The ways in which the addition of "interraciality" would likely
reinforce monoracial privilege are more subtle. Creating this new category
of prohibited discrimination would not merely strengthen the force of Title
VII's anti-discrimination mandate, but would also imply that such
discrimination did not, and could not, fall within the existing prohibition on
race discrimination. The addition of "interraciality" therefore would
necessarily affect the meaning of "race" in Title VII doctrine. Most saliently,
"race" would include monoraciality but not interraciality, reinforcing
monoraciality as a core component of race.
Of course, the existing language of Title VII already maintains
monoracial privilege. Silence about an aspect of identity does not mean that
aspect is irrelevant. Instead, as Onwuachi-Willig so convincingly illustrates
throughout According to Our Hearts, such silence reinforces the privileged
end of an identity hierarchy, in this case monoraciality. 124 Yet, naming the
identity does not in turn eliminate that privilege, nor does it necessarily
"destabilize our notions of clear-cut, fixed categories of race."' 125 Instead, the
new category would have its own regulatory effects, policing what falls
within both the new and old categories. Race would more explicitly include
monoraciality, but interraciality would be something other than race.
Removing interraciality from the category of race may also limit
understandings of the performative nature of race, further solidifying rather
than destabilizing notions of race. Many scholars have previously argued
that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination because of race should
encompass discrimination based on racial performance. 126 In other words,
race must be conceptualized as more than phenotype; race comes into
existence through acts. In this way, race is a performance much like
marriage is a performance. Removing interraciality from the category of race
risks removing a key act-the formation of personal relationships-through
which race is produced.
Instead of supporting a new category of discrimination on the basis of
interraciality, Onwuachi-Willig's goals might be better served by embracing
the relational nature of race, racial privilege, and racial discrimination. The
define workplace rules and expectations according to white cultural norms as "transparently white
decisionmaking").
124. This point is made implicitly throughout According to Our Hearts. See ONWUACHI-
WILLIG, supra note I passim. For example, see id. at 257-58.
125. Id. at 265.
126. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Minu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259,
1262, 1294 (2000); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by
Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1134, 1199-230, 1269 (2004); Kenji Yoshino,
Covering, Ill YALE L.J. 769, 887 (2002); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race
Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 365, 433-34 (2006);
Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup Solidarity,
77 IND. L.J. 63, 65-70 (2002).
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analysis in According to Our Hearts provides the most compelling account
to date of the ways in which the choice of one's intimate partner influences
understandings of race in the workplace, as well as throughout society, and
the benefits and harms that flow therefrom. 127 Race is therefore not lodged
solely in the individual, but instead comes into being through the
relationships we choose 28 and others' reactions to those choices.
Indeed, the relational nature of race is illustrated repeatedly throughout
According to Our Hearts, starting with Onwuachi-Willig's expert dissection
of the Rhinelander case. 129 As discussed in Part II, no law prevented
Leonard from staying married to Alice. 130 Instead, Leonard chose to end the
marriage to maintain his relationship with his parents, his social standing,
and his inheritance. That he had to choose between marriage and those
privileges reveals that Leonard's whiteness was not static. Instead, his status
as white-and the privileges that flowed therefrom-was rooted in activity
policed by his family and elite, white social circle. '1' Leonard's family and
social circle were likely concerned that Alice, a black woman, might gain
access to white wealth through her marriage to Leonard. But they were
likely just as concerned that Leonard would continue to claim whiteness
while simultaneously engaging in activities that threatened white supremacy.
One way to read the case, then, is that Leonard sacrificed his marriage to
maintain his whiteness.
Whiteness is thereby performed, or not performed, through marriage. 1
32
Onwuachi-Willig's contemporary interviews of interracial couples reveal
that such performances continue to this day. Monoracial marriage signals
"racial loyalty" not just among African Americans, 133 but also among
whites. White men continue to give up some degree of white privilege when
they marry African-American women. 134 At the very least, being in an
interracial relationship eliminates the privilege of not having to think about
127. Noah Zatz engaged in a similar analysis, but he confined his analysis to relationships
occurring within the workplace, focusing on interracial friendships and other forms of' interracial
solidarity at work. Compare Zatz, supra note 126, at 65-70, with Camille Gear Rich, Marginal
Whiteness, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1497, 1553-54 (2010) (questioning Zatz's understanding and
deployment of race performance).
128. Of course, choice is constrained by marital privilege. See supra Part Ill. Ideally,
Onwuachi-Willig's analysis could be extended beyond intimate partners to include all relationships.
129. See ONWUAC"I-WILLIG, supra note I passim.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 45-50.
131. See ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I passim.
132. For a similar description, see MORAN, supra note 7, at 191.
133. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note I, at 215.
134. Id. at 256.
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race. 135 It is therefore not surprising that there are fewer interracial
marriages between white men and black women than there are between
black men and white women. 136 White men, at the top of both race and
gender hierarchies, have more to lose from interracial marriage than anyone
else. 137
Onwuachi-Willig's proposal that Title VII be amended to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of "interraciality" risks obscuring this
constitutive interaction between race and relationship. By separating race
from relationship, the proposal leaves performances of race arguably outside
the reach of Title VII. Instead of calling for a new category, Onwuachi-
Willig's analysis better supports a more robust conception of the existing
category of "race." If some employees are advantaged by performing
whiteness through monoracial marriage, while others are harmed by failing
to perform race in that manner, that is discrimination because of "race."'
' 38
Bolstering the existing category of race in this manner challenges
monoraciality by exposing the ways that it participates in the performance of
race, thereby opening the door to considerations of other ways by which race
and racial privilege are performed and maintained in the workplace.'
39
Privileged performances thus might be better exposed and questioned,
freeing scholars and judges to think more creatively about law's ability to
address inequalities in the workplace and, ultimately, in society at large.
Doing so might in fact put us on the road toward realizing Onwuachi-
Willig's "hope about a refraning of the normative ideal for family, or better
yet, of a release of any need for an ideal at all,"' 4 ° thereby "destabiliz[ing]
our notions of clear-cut, fixed categories of race."141
135. It is possible this privilege explains John Mayer's disgust at the thought of dating women
with a (non-white) race. Id. at 131-32.
136. For further discussion of these differential rates of black-white marriage, see id. at 126.
137. Onwuachi-Willig's analysis therefore undermines recent suggestions that African-
American women are affirmatively choosing not to date, or marry, white men. See RALPH RICHARD
BANKS, Is MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? 120-66 (2011). Of course, both whites and blacks may
fear the loss of racial status when engaging in interracial relationships. But whites, and specifically
white men, have more societal privilege to lose than others even as they may be viewed as
occupying a superior position within the relationship itself.
138. Indeed, this was Judge Calabresi's conclusion in Holcomb v. lona College, 521 F.3d 130,
131 (2d Cir. 2008).
139. For example, by exposing the ways in which existing structures are built around white
norms. See Flagg, supra note 123, at 2029.
140. ONWUACHI-WILLIG, supra note 1, at 279-80.
141. Id. at 265.
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V. CONCLUSION
According to Our Hearts compellingly dissects multiple ways that
performances of marriage and race intersect and inform each other even in a
world of facially race-neutral family law. Marital privilege informs racial
privilege, and racial privilege informs marital privilege. Onwuachi-Willig
seeks to distribute marital privilege equally across race and interraciality, but
her analysis also invites a broader challenge to marital status itself This
Article has analyzed how such a challenge to marital status might disrupt
privilege rather than merely distributing it, better destabilizing privileged
understandings of both relationships and race. Onwuachi-Willig's analysis,
as extended, may thus free our hearts to experience even more diverse forms
of family, work, and play.

